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The fact that we develop feelings towards androids, i.e., objects with a humanlike appearance, 
has fascinated people since ancient times. However, as a short survey of the topic in history, 
science fiction literature and film shows, our emotional reactions towards them are ambivalent. 
On the one hand, we can develop feelings of empathy almost as we do with real human beings; 
on the other hand, we feel repulsion or dyspathy when those creatures show a very high degree 
of human likeness. Recently, Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori coined the term “uncanny 
valley” to refer to this effect. The aim of this essay is, first, to give an explanation as to why we 
feel empathy towards androids although we know that they do not have feelings themselves. 
This presupposes a perception-based concept of empathy which is going to be developed on the 
basis of some of Theodor Lipps’ ideas. The second question to be answered is why empathy 
with androids turns into dyspathy when they become very humanlike. As I will argue, this is due 
to a particular kind of interference between perception and the imagination when confronted 
with very humanlike objects. This makes androids quite special objects right at the divide 
between humans and non-humans. They are non-human, but we feel ill at ease when treating 
them as mere objects. 
 
1. Emotional responses towards androids 
The human capacity to feel emotions towards inanimate objects that are humanlike – 
emotions which we normally only feel towards real humans—has fascinated people 
since ancient times. An example is provided by the myth of Pygmalion who falls in love 
with a female statue he created himself. However, the improvement of mechanics in the 
18th century also opened up much more realistic possibilities to construct humanlike 
automata, backed up by philosophical mechanism. In 1738, Jacques de Vaucanson caused 
a sensation with the construction of a mechanical flute player, and other stunning 
automata followed. This development was also reflected in literary fiction which was 
often concerned with the emotional interaction of humans and automata. Well-known 
examples are E.T.A. Hoffmann’s “Der Sandmann” (The Sandman) where a young man 
falls in love with a mechanical doll, or Mary Shelley’s “Frankenstein” where a man-made 
creature starts to develop an emotional life of it’s own. 
In the 19th century the term “android” became prevalent to designate humanlike 
automata. The novel “L’Eve future” (Future Eve) by Auguste Villiers de l’Ilse-Adam which 
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originally appeared in 1886 contributed to its popularization. In the plot, a female robot 
is constructed as a life-like substitute for one of the protagonist’s facile fiancées with the 
more general aim of finding an alternative to real women, with their bodily deficiencies 
and weaknesses of character. In the following, I want to use the term android in a very 
broad sense comprising all kinds of objects which although not human, are humanlike 
and have the capacity to elicit emotions normally only shown towards our conspecifics. 
Empathy plays a particular role in this context, a topic which was the subject of several 
literary works and movies (often inspired by a novel or short story) of the last hundred 
years, e.g., Stanislav Lem’s “Solaris” (filmed by Tarkowskij and Soderbergh), Ridley 
Scott’s “Blade Runner” after a novel of Philip K. Dick, or Steven Spielberg’s “A.I. – 
Artificial Intelligence” (inspired by Brian Aldiss’ short story). An interesting point raised 
by a number of these works is that humans who are incapable of displaying empathy 
towards androids are themselves deficient. They suffer from an impaired emotional life, 
which amounts to a kind of moral failure. 
The idea that a lack of empathy towards humanlike but inanimate objects is 
morally questionable is not restricted to fiction. Impressive examples are provided by 
Milgram-style experiments with avatars, i.e., virtual characters.1 In the experiments the 
participants had to punish an avatar with electroshocks if she did not accomplish certain 
linguistic tasks. The results show that in spite of the fact that all participants knew for 
sure that neither the subject nor the shocks were real, the participants who saw and 
heard the avatar tended to respond to the situation at a subjective, behavioral and 
physiological level as if confronted with a real person.2 Yet, as in the original experiment 
carried out by Milgram, this did not necessarily mean that people backed out of the 
experiment.  Most people, however, did feel ill at ease when punishing the avatar, and if 
one watches the video of the experiment, one gets the impression that the suppression 
of this feeling would have bad effects on our capacity to develop morally relevant 
feelings towards real humans. 
Yet, in the history of the topic there is also a second strand that highlights the 
pathological aspect of the emotional involvement of humans with androids. A well-
known example from literature is Nathanel’s love for the mechanical doll “Olimpia”—
jan android avant la letter—in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s short story “The Sandman.” To the 
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other characters in the novel this is a pathological response, and they—as well as the 
reader—get(s) an eerie feeling when confronted with Olimpia. I want to call this feeling 
of eeriness dyspathy. Dyspathy is more than just apathy—a lack of feeling; it is a distinctly 
negative, aversive feeling towards androids. Recently, in the film industry, dyspathy has 
become a problem with respect to the development of new technologies in the realm of 
animated movies. Very elaborate techniques like motion-capture or morphing have been 
developed to produce life-like movements and facial expressions in film characters with 
the aim of eliciting in the spectator the same empathy for non-human characters as for 
human characters. Despite these elaborate technologies, some recent films that were 
entirely created with their help have been accused of a severe failure in this respect, e.g., 
“Polar Express” (US/2004) by Robert Zemeckis. The spectators did not empathize with 
the small children who are the protagonists of the movie, but rather showed signs of 
dyspathy.3 Paradoxically, dyspathy occurs particularly with characters that show a very 
high degree of humanlikeness. Therefore, the team of the movie “Shrek” decided to 
decrease anthropomorphism in the character of Princess Fiona, because “she was 
beginning to look too real, and the effect was getting distinctly unpleasant.”4 If we take 
this evidence seriously, an explanation of our emotional involvement with androids has 
to elucidate two things: first of all, why we feel empathy with androids although we 
know that they do not have feelings, and secondly why not all androids are capable of 
eliciting empathy, but some of them rather produce dyspathy. 
The two kinds of the emotional responses of humans towards androids were 
brought together in a hypothesis by the Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori.5 He 
conjectured that humanlike objects elicit emotional responses similar to real humans 
proportionate to their degree of human resemblance: The more humanlike a robot or 
another object is made, the more empathetic emotional responses from human beings it 
will elicit. Yet, if a certain degree of similarity is reached, repulsion is suddenly the 
typical emotional response. Only when the object in question becomes almost 
indistinguishable from real humans do the responses become once again empathic. The 
relationship between humanlikeness and emotional response can also be illustrated 
graphically (see fig. 1). Mori called the emerging gap in the figure, where positive 
empathic responses suddenly turn into repulsion, the “uncanny valley.”6 The term 
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“uncanny” refers to a famous notion introduced to psychology by Ernst Jentsch in “Über 
die Psychologie des Unheimlichen” (On the Psychology of the Uncanny) from 1906, which 
was taken up by Freud in his essay “Das Unheimliche” (The Uncanny) from 1919. In our 
context the term is primarily used to express that very humanlike objects do not just 
fail to elicit empathy, but produce a sensation of eeriness7 which I called dyspathy. 
Supposedly, the effect is amplified if the object is able to perform movements by itself. 
Since androids are very humanlike robots, they often fall into the uncanny valley, as long 
as they are not perfect copies of humans. 
Mori’s hypothesis has a lot of intuitive plausibility, but one has to keep in mind 
that he did nt test it empirically. Although there has recently been increasing research 
activity8 on this subject, the phenomenon is still contested. Nevertheless, I wish to 
propose my own explanation. A satisfying explanation has to consider three general 
approaches to the topic: a broadly phenomenological one that reflects on the 
phenomenon from the first-person perspective, an empirical one based on empirical 
research in psychology and the neurosciences, and a philosophical one which provides 
the conceptual tools to bridge the gap between the other two approaches.9 Moreover, 
the philosophical approach should provide a more unified perspective for the diverse 
strands of empirical research by embedding them in a more view of how the mind  
works. The aim of the explanation along these three lines is to give us a better 
understanding of the two kinds of emotional responses towards androids—empathy and 
dyspathy. More precisely, I will shed light on the following questions: Why do we feel 
empathy towards androids at all? Why do we cease to feel empathy when they become 
exceedingly humanlike? And why do we not just stop feeling empathy, but start to 
respond with dyspathy? To answer these questions, we first have to develop an 
appropriate account of empathy. It has to explain why we feel empathy with androids at 
all, even if we know that they do not have feelings. This looks at first glance like a 
paradox. Is empathy not just defined as feeling someone else’s emotions? One might be 
tempted by this paradox to think that empathy with androids relies on an illusion which 
makes us accept the android as a real human being. Yet this strongly contradicts 
phenomenology, so I will suggest a different explanation. Its core is a kind of imaginative 
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perception which is involved in empathic responses to androids. Finally, the results will 




Fig. 1: Simplified version of Mori‘s original graph ( MacDorman and Minato 2005) 
 
 
II. Perception-based Empathy in the spirit of Theodor Lipps 
In ordinary language, empathy is often characterized as the ability to “put oneself into 
another’s shoes.” This involves three dimensions which are not clearly distinguished: 
knowing what a person is feeling, feeling what another person is feeling, and responding 
compassionately to another person’s distress. The third dimension is sometimes called 
sympathy since it involves a different feeling than the one of the target. However, in 
cases where sympathy depends on empathy, i.e., on literally feeling the other person’s 
distress, the term empathy might as well refer to the whole emotional state.10 Let us 
therefore distinguish a narrow and a broad use of the concept. In the narrow sense 
empathy only includes sharing another person’s emotional state; in the wide sense 
(which comes, from my point of view, closer to its ordinary meaning) it includes a 
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compassionate response. I will be using the term in its broad sense including all 
dimensions. Since I assume that we know that androids do not really have feelings, the 
first dimension does not play a role in empathy with androids. Nevertheless, there is a 
way to make sense of the other two dimensions: even though we are well aware than 
the android does not have feelings, we can, in a way, come to feel what we perceive an 
android as feeling, and respond compassionately to it.  Despite this, many approaches to 
empathy exclude empathy with non-sentient beings right from start. I will use as an 
example an influential formula created by Elliott Sober and David Wilson. They provide 
the following definition of empathy: 
 
“S empathizes with O’s experience of emotion E if and only if O feels E, S believes that 
O feels E, and this causes S to feel E for O.”11 
 
Obviously, this is not an eligible concept of empathy for our purposes. The demand that 
there be a belief that O feels E conceptually excludes the possibility of our feeling 
empathy with androids, since we do not believe that they really have feelings.  
There are, however, other concepts of empathy which have a less intellectual and more 
perceptual basis. They were even prevalent at the beginning of the concept’s historical 
evolution, which is rather short in comparison to the history of other philosophical 
concepts. Although the word has its roots in ancient Greek, the term was introduced 
into psychology and philosophy only at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century.12 The 
English term “empathy” goes back to the psychologist Edward Titchener (1867-1927) 
who used it in 1909 as a translation of the German term Einfühlung, which played a 
major role in philosophical aesthetics by the end of the 19th century.13 One of the 
most interesting thinkers dealing with empathy was Theodor Lipps (1851-1914). Like 
most people at the time, he studied empathy mainly as an ingredient in aesthetic 
experience. More precisely, he saw aesthetic experiences as a specific kind of 
empathetic perception of external states of affairs in analogy to the model of human 
empathy. The notion of an expressive movement (Ausdrucksbewegung) is of particular 
importance for his approach. This is a bodily movement or sound that serves the 
expression of a person’s emotional state of mind.14 As Lipps states, the emotion and its 
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expressive movement are not just causally connected, but rather we can perceive the 
former somehow directly in the latter. How is it possible to see an emotion in a physical 
object, and why does this involve some kind of empathic feeling (miterleben)? 
It is not enough that we ourselves show the same expressive behavior when we 
are undergoing an emotion of the same type as the emotion that we see the other 
person as having. The reason for this is that experiencing an emotion (including the 
corresponding expression) is different from seeing another person’s expressive 
movements. In the latter case we are entertaining a visual representation, in the former 
we are feeling muscular tension and skin sensations, but we do not see our own 
expressive behavior, or feel the other person’s. For that reason, our own emotional 
experiences as such cannot establish a connection between the feeling and the visual 
representation of the expressive behavior. Another explanatory approach discussed by 
Lipps—which would probably be adopted by many philosophers today—suggests that 
the link is established by empirical association: We have observed a connection between 
an emotion and a certain type of expressive behavior numerous times; therefore, we 
infer that the emotion is present if we see someone behaving in a specific way.15 
Although this kind of inference might be relevant in some cases (for instance, learning 
that wagging its tail is a sign of a dog’s happiness), it cannot account for all kinds of 
perceptually based empathy. As Lipps was well aware, infants respond much earlier to 
their mother’s faces’ emotional expression than they can be credited with the capacity 
to draw inferences.  
Therefore, Lipps concludes that the visual (or auditive) representation of 
expressive behavior has to trigger an unconscious simulation mechanism which he calls 
innere Nachahmung: a visual representation of expressive behavior produces a 
kinesthetic representation of the kind we experience when we are really executing that 
behavior. This idea is consistent with recent empirical research which shows that face-
based emotion recognition, in particular, is dependent on some sort of simulation. It 
even occurs in neonates by mimicking facial expressions.16 Further evidence is provided 
by studies finding deficits in face-based emotion recognition and emotion production in 
people with facial paralysis.17 
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At the neurological level, resonance phenomena studied in monkeys and humans 
were also brought together with Lipps’ account of empathy.18 So called mirror neurons 
are neurons that get activated when an individual either personally experiences mental 
events or when he or she observes a sign that another individual is experiencing or is 
about to experience the same type of event.19 Yet, activation in the observer occurs 
mostly at a level below the threshold of consciousness. The trigger signs can consist of a 
behavioral manifestation, facial expression, or a stimulus that can be expected to 
produce the mental event in question.20 For example, when one person is observing 
another, either wincing in pain, showing a face contorted with pain, or being stabbed 
with a knife, the observer’s pain mirror neurons discharge. Therefore, the other 
personobserver feels the same emotions and may, as a consequence, react 
compassionately to the other person’s distress. I do not want to discuss the 
neurological evidence in detail, but it seems to provide support of Lipps’ view of “innere 
Nachahmung. Finally, I will define perception-based empathy based on Lipps’ account: 
 
(1) A person S empathizes with another person O’s experience of emotion E if S 
perceives O as undergoing E, and this perception causes S to feel E for O. 
 
This definition avoids explicitly ascribing emotions to O, which distinguishes it from 
more cognitive definitions of empathy that involve imagining being in someone else’s 
situation by simulating the person’s thoughts and experiences. Yet, it is still not apt for 
our purposes, because we do not want to say that androids really undergo emotions. 
We do not literally see an inanimate object showing an emotion. We are even aware 
that androids belong to a category of inanimate objects that do not have emotions. 
Nevertheless, an inanimate object does not have to be very similar to a human being to 
illicit empathy. A rather low degree of human resemblance is sufficient, as in a rag doll, 
for example. Therefore, I am suggesting that the imagination must somehow be involved 
in the emergence of empathy with androids. This idea is captured by the following 
modification of the previous definition: 
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(2) A person S empathizes with an android A’s imagined experience of emotion E if S 
imaginatively perceives A as undergoing E and this imaginative perception causes 
S to feel E for A. 
 
However, to fully understand what this definition amounts to, we have to obtain a 
better grasp of how imaginative perception works. 
 
III. Imaginative Perception 
The debate about pictorial representation is a helpful starting point. In this context the 
notion of imaginative perception has been most prominently discussed. One of the 
guiding intuitions of this discussion is that pictorial representation differs in specific ways 
from linguistic representation. Pictures seem to represent in a less conventional way 
than words; they somehow appear more similar to the depicted objects, and allow us to 
recognize them more easily without any special kind of semantic knowledge. To explain 
these facts, a variety of accounts of pictorial representation bring into play the concept 
of imaginative perception. The basic idea is that pictorial experience invokes a 
combination of perception and imagination: we simultaneously perceive the marks on 
the surface of a picture and imagine the depicted object.21 Although this approach is 
aimed at pictorial representation, we can learn something from it about the interplay of 
perception and imagination in empathy with androids. This is not to say that we have to 
endorse it as the best account of pictorial representation. We are using the debate 
about pictorial representation only because the topic of imaginative perception has been 
studied most thoroughly in this context. It can help us to answer two questions: How 
does imaginative perception work? And how is it involved in empathy with androids? 
 The first thing to notice is that the imagining involved cannot just be 
propositional. Merely supposing that an android is having an emotion is not sufficient 
because there is no connection with perception, and perception seems to play a major 
role in this kind of empathy. Another straightforward suggestion can be discarded for 
similar reasons. Can we not simply say that we imagine the android’s expressive 
behavior, facial expression or exposition to the relevant stimulus being a human’s 
expressive behavior, facial expression or exposition to the relevant stimulus? Yet, this 
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does not lead us far enough in the direction of perception, either. Let me explain why 
with the help of an example: we can imagine a banana being a telephone without 
imaginatively perceiving the banana as a telephone. We are just pretending that it is one 
by behaving in suitable ways, like putting one end to our ears and speaking into the 
other one. However, this is not the kind of imagination we are looking for. As we 
conceived the situation, it is the perception of the android that produces empathy in us, 
and not our pretending that it is human. This holds independently of how exactly one 
thinks of pretense.22 
 Yet, there is a more promising account of imaginative perception proposed by 
Kendall Walton.23 He claims that someone who is looking at a picture, for instance, 
Meindert Hobbema’s Water Mill with the Great Red Roof imagines that the object of his or 
her gaze is a mill. In other words: in seeing the canvas he or she imaginatively sees a mill. 
As I said before, I do not want to discuss whether this is an adequate account of 
pictorial representation. However, the idea of imagining that a perceptual experience of 
one thing is a perceptual experience of something else extends quite naturally to non-
pictorial cases. Walton himself gives an example in a later article.24 In this article he 
takes up a proposal by Patrick Maynard using Hitchcock’s movie Vertigo in order to 
refute an objection. The protagonist of the movie, Scottie dresses up the girl Judy in 
order to enjoy a vivid imaginative experience of perceiving the now deceased woman he 
knew as Madeleine. In seeing the dressed-up Judy he imagines seeing Madeleine, and 
with the help of this imaginative perception he wants to produce the emotions he would 
have when seeing the real Madeleine. (Finally, Judy turns out to be Madeleine, but this 
does not matter here). Applied to our case, this is to say that in seeing the looks and 
the movements of the android and its reactions to an emotion-producing stimulus, we 
imagine perceiving a human expressive behavior, facial expression or reactions to the 
relevant stimulus. 
 But what is the relation between the two episodes of seeing something and 
thereby imagining that one is perceiving something else? One might suggest as a minimal 
condition that the two occur simultaneously. However, this is not a sufficient condition, 
since we can entertain an imaginary experience while at the same time having quite 
different perceptual experiences, e.g., when I imagine going out tonight while looking out 
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of the window of my office. Yet, the way we are talking about imaginary perception as 
imagining that a perceptual experience of one thing is a perceptual experience of 
something else insinuates a stronger connection. It suggests that the two episodes are 
intentionally related: what I perceive has to be the object of my imagination. Moreover, 
as we have seen, imagining one experience to be another has to be something more 
experiential than supposing or pretending that one experience is the other.25 One might 
be tempted by the latter desideratum to think that imaginary perception consists in an 
act of visualization. This seems to be a very natural suggestion with respect to 
imaginative perception in pictorial experience. According to this view seeing a picture 
amounts to a fusion of two things: the experience of seeing the surface of the picture 
and the experience of visualizing the scene depicted.26 
 However, at this point we have to leave the analogy with pictorial representation 
behind. The distinctive phenomenology of empathy with androids is not altogether 
identical with the one of pictorial experience. In particular, it does not involve 
visualization. We do not visualize a human undergoing an emotion when we 
imaginatively perceive an android as having an emotion. In order to come to terms with 
this problem we have to take a closer look at the structure of perceptual experience. 
 
IV. Perceptual experience and imaginary perception 
The debate about perceptual experience is vast, and I can hardly cover all the problems 
in this context. I will concentrate on the aspects which are relevant to the current topic 
and try to avoid unnecessary theoretical commitments. Perceptual experience has two 
general aspects: it has content, and it has phenomenal character (in the broadest sense 
of the term). Different kinds of perceptual experience can have the same content. I can, 
for instance, see someone walking down the street or hear someone walking down the 
street. Although the content of the perceptual experience is, in a certain sense, the 
same, both experiences do not have the same phenomenal character. The phenomenal 
aspect of a perceptual experience is what it is like for a subject to have it. Each sense 
modality has a particular phenomenal quality. There is also a phenomenal difference in 
perceptual experiences within every sensory modality, e.g., between seeing red and 
seeing blue.  
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 With the help of these distinctions we can shed some more light on the 
functioning of imaginary perception. I am suggesting that imagining a perceptual 
experience of an (or the) object F as a perceptual experience of an (or the) object G 
involves the following: Because of certain salient similarities between the perceived 
object F and another object (or kind of objects) G the concept of a (or the) G is 
triggered. Yet, it is not applied to the perception, but entertained off-line, as it is 
commonly expressed in the language of contemporary theories of the imagination. This 
metaphor can be spelled out in the following way: a selected mental state or at least a 
rough facsimile of such a state is created by the faculty of the imagination. The real state 
and its imaginary counterpart are intrinsically very similar (they are wired into the same 
neural circuits, as, for instance, Goldman puts it),27 but they differ with respect to their 
input and output conditions. Whereas the real state is triggered by the apprehension of 
facts, and normally leads to an action, this does not hold for its imaginary counterpart 
which is produced independently of the facts, and remains inert with respect to action. 
I propose that a similar mechanism is also involved in empathy with androids. A 
concept is imaginatively or imaginarily triggered, but not applied to the situation; i.e., the 
subject does not have a disposition to judge that the present object is a human being. 
Despite its not being applied in the strict sense, the triggering of the concept does 
influence the perception. This might be described as a “blending” of perception and 
imagined concept.28 Yet, the concept does not change the content of the perception – I 
am still seeing an F and not a G – but it does influence its phenomenal feel. Therefore, 
perceiving an (or the) F feels (to some extent) like perceiving an (or the) G. Of course, a 
concept can be more or less strongly triggered all the way up to full application. The 
more strongly it is triggered, the more vivid is the imagining, and the more the 
perception of F feels like a perception of G. How strongly a concept is triggered depends 
on several dimensions like the number of relevant features, as well as their typicality and 
salience. As a rule of thumb, the more features there are, and the more typical and 
salient they are, the stronger will the concept of a (or the) G be triggered, and the more 
vivid will the imagining and phenomenal feel be. This can be illustrated again with the 
help of Hitchcock’s Vertigo. The perception of the dressed-up Judy triggers the concept 
of Madeleine in Scottie. As a result, perceiving Judy feels for him somehow like 
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perceiving Madeleine. The more features both women share and the more typical and 
salient these are, the more the perception of Judy feels like a perception of Madeleine. 
This Madeleine-like perception of Judy then produces emotions (like hate or affection) 
the protagonist would have towards the real Madeleine, but not towards the real Judy. 
Let us now apply this thought to the case of empathy with androids: Seeing the 
humanlike features M of an android triggers the concept of a human N. For that reason, 
seeing the android feels like seeing a human being, and its looks, movements and the 
exposition to a stimulus that can be expected to induce the emotion in question in 
humans feels (to some extent) like seeing a human being undergoing the corresponding 
emotion. Yet, as was argued above, the perception of these signs of an emotion in 
another can cause the same emotions in us, and lead to a compassionate response to 
the other’s distress. Since these are the two dimensions of empathy we are interested 
in, we have by now arrived at the core of my explanation of how empathy with androids 
is possible. Moreover, we have a firmer grip on the intuition that a lack of empathy 
towards androids is an indicator of a more general deficit in the moral sensitivity of a 
person. If seeing an android in distress feels like seeing a human being in distress, a 
person who is too blunt to develop the morally relevant emotion of empathy in this 
case will also not respond with the appropriate emotion when confronted with real 
human suffering. 
Although this explanation has some initial plausibility, one might, nevertheless, be 
troubled by some worries. First, this account seems to commit me to accept qualia, i.e. 
particular sensory qualities of experiences. Yet, I think my view is acceptable to anyone 
except eliminativists tout court.29 The reason is that the account is compatible with the 
view that the qualitative character of a concept is determined by its intentional content, 
and I take it that this is a crucial question with respect to reductionism. That is to say, I 
am prepared to subscribe to a thesis which is called the Phenomenology of Intentionality.30 
It says that mental states of the sort commonly cited as paradigmatically intentional have 
phenomenal character that is inseparable from their intentional content. However, since 
we are just dealing with the phenomenal aspect of concepts here, I have to emphasize 
that I am only willing to accept the thesis of the Phenomenology of Intentionality with 
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respect to them. It seems plausible that – if concepts do have a qualitative aspect at all – 
it has to be related to their intentional content. 
This brings me to the second and more important objection. One might challenge 
my position since it deviates grossly from philosophical mainstream. I have to assume 
that concepts have phenomenal character, and this is not at all evident. A lot of people 
think that only perceptions or sensations can have a qualitative aspect. This objection 
depends on a certain wide-spread account of concepts in philosophy. In this view, 
concepts are analyzed as abstractions which are entirely detached from bodily aspects. 
A highly influential version of this approach was elaborated minutely by Jerry Fodor.31 It 
assumes that concepts are abstract, amodal and arbitrary representations in a “language 
of thought” constituted of symbols that have subject-predicate structure and are 
manipulated by logical rules. Although this has been for a long time the predominant 
view, it has recently been challenged by evidence from clinical neuropsychology and 
cognitive neuroscience.32 The evidence is supposed to show the following: distributed 
networks of discrete brain regions are active during object processing. The distribution 
of these categories varies as a function of semantic category, and the same regions are 
active, at least partly, when objects from a category are recognized, named, imagined, 
and when reading and answering questions about them. To accommodate this evidence, 
an account of concepts was proposed that differs profoundly from the standard view. It 
suggests that we see concepts as “embodied,” i.e. (at least concrete perceptual) 
concepts are neural representations located in sensory-motor areas in the brain.33 On this 
account concepts are not abstract, amodal and arbitrary, but involve the same neural 
activation pattern that is present in the perception, imagination and interaction with the 
relevant objects. If this is true, it seems quite natural to assume that these concepts can 
have a qualitative aspect. However, I cannot defend this claim here in detail. I just invoke 
it here to show that there are independent reasons to challenge the traditional paradigm 
of concepts. Finally, the reasons for seeing concepts as embodied coincide with the 
reasons to ascribe phenomenal character to them. However, if anyone who defends 
another theory of concepts is ready to grant that much, this would be sufficient to make 
my point.34  
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5. How does the uncanny valley emerge? 
In the beginning I formulated three questions which I wanted to answer: Why do we feel 
empathy towards androids at all? Why do we stop feeling empathy when they become 
exceedingly humanlike? And why do we not just stop feeling empathy but start  
responding with dyspathy? So far we have mainly dealt with the first question. To 
provide an explanation of the uncanny valley we have to find satisfying answers to the 
remaining two. At the heart of my explanation lies the idea that in these cases the 
triggering of the concept gets so strong that it is about to turn into full-fledged concept 
application. Yet the attempt to apply the concept fails since the object of the perception 
is not accepted as an instance of the concept. For this reason the process leading to 
empathy is brusquely interrupted. However, because of the humanlikeness of the 
android the concept is triggered again and is repeatedly about to be elicited. This leads 
to a kind of very fast oscillation between four situations: the mere triggering of the 
concept, the reaching of the threshold of concept application, the failure of concept 
application resulting in a complete turning off of the concept, and the renewed triggering 
in continuing on to perceive the object. 
This suggestion finds some empirical support by the study of vision.35 There is 
research concerning the perception of ambiguous or fragmented figures which shows 
that, as the visual impression changes, so does the scan-path of the eye-movements (i.e. 
the sequence of fixations).36 This suggests that the visual information leads to the 
generation of a hypothesis in the brain which, in turn, directs the eye-movements. In our 
case a constant alternation between two hypotheses of the kind “a is a human being” 
(concept triggering) and “a is not a human being” (concept deactivation) would take 
place. One would expect that this is correlated with incoherent eye-movements, and it 
can be anticipated that this will be accompanied by a feeling of confusion on the side of 
the subject. But does it explain the feeling of eeriness towards the entities falling into 
the uncanny valley? If it did, then all kinds of oscillations between different hypotheses 
should arouse that feeling.37 
The proposed mechanism, therefore, seems to fall prey to a similar critique as 
Freud advanced against Ernst Jentsch’s explanation of the uncanny.38 Jentsch 
characterized it by doubts whether a lifeless object might be, as a matter of fact, 
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animate, or whether an apparently animate being really is alive 39 My explanation of 
dyspathy with androids seems to come close to this intuition formulated in terms of the 
oscillation between the activation and deactivation of the concept of a human, i.e. a 
fortiori living being. The major difference between Jentsch’s account and mine is that, 
from my point of view, these doubts take place at a sub-conscious level. They do not 
necessarily invoke a disposition to make the corresponding judgments. Freud criticized 
Jentsch’s account as being too intellectual. Does not the same hold for my explanation, 
too? Is it not just a mere conceptual confusion? 
 This objection does not take into account that there is something phenomenally 
special about the concepts invoked in dyspathy with androids. Perceiving a human being 
has a very distinctive phenomenology, a kind of feeling that something is alive or 
endowed with a soul in the Aristotelian sense of the term.40 In triggering the human 
concept this feeling gets activated and transferred to the perception of the inanimate 
object. However, if the threshold of concept application is reached, but it fails, this 
feeling is all of a sudden cut off. This is comparable to a sudden disenchantment: 
something that seemed to be alive and soulful a moment ago now appears cold and 
dead.41 The alternation between these two states amounts to the feeling of eeriness. 
We are therefore now able to state the full-fledged explanation of the uncanny valley. 
The feeling of dyspathy with androids can be traced back to two elements: The first one 
is the oscillation between concept application prompted by imaginary perception and 
the failure of concept application since the object does not qualify as an instance of the 
concept. However, the first element just amounts to a feeling of conceptual confusion 
which also arises in other cases with a similar structure. The second element explains 
the specific character of eeriness which is characteristic of this particular kind of 
confusion. The triggering of the concept of a human being by an object involves seeing it 
in some sense as alive or endowed with a soul. The oscillation of concept activation and 
deactivation, therefore, also leads to an oscillation of the corresponding phenomenal 
feeling of seeing something as alive and seeing something as dead. Both elements taken 
together can account for the eerie feeling of dyspathy with androids. 
 I now want to close the circle by coming back to the use of androids in fiction 
discussed in the opening sections of the paper. As we saw, literary texts discovered the 
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phenomenon of dyspathy with androids long before Mori formulated his hypothesis of 
the uncanny valley. On the other hand, it poses a practical threat to the use of androids 
in fiction, particularly movies, in so far as the recipient is called upon to empathize with 
them. It therefore looks as if we ought to supplement the three laws of robotics which 
guided Isaac Asimov in writing his short stories by a fourth one. Asimov’s laws are:42 (1) 
A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to 
come to harm. (2) A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except 
where such orders would conflict with the First Law. (3) A robot must protect its own 
existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. The 
suggested supplement would be something like: (4) A robot must not be too similar to a 
human being if it is supposed to elicit empathy. 
 
                                                 
1 See Mel Slater et al. 2005. There is also a video of the experiment available online. 
2 Milgram-style experiments were also conducted with some more basic kinds of robots. 
In these cases people felt empathy, but not up to the level of real human beings 
(Bartneck et al. 2005). 
3 See, for instance, Paul Clinton’s review of the movie for CNN (Clinton 2004). 
4 This is a statement of Lucia Modesto from PDI/Dreamworks quoted in Wischler 
(2002). 
5 See Mori 1970 and some more recent remarks in Mori 2005. 
6 There is, however, a discussion as to the shape of the function, see, for instance, 
Bartneck et al. 2007. 
7 For a study on the emotional valence of the expressions “eerie” or “creepy” in 
contrast to “strange”, see Ho et al. 2008. 
8 The debate started, more or less, with the IEEE-RAS Humanoids Workshop: Views on 
the Uncanny Valley, 2005. A pioneer with respect to the empirical exploration of the 
valley was Karl F. MacDorman (see, for instance, MacDorman 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 
MacDorman et al. 2005, MacDorman/Ishiguro 2006). From the more practical side the 
work of Hiroshi Ishiguro (University of Osaka) had a great impact on the discussion. He 
constructed several stunning humanoid robots made out of silicone, among them a 
double of himself and one of his 5-year old daughter (film sequences are available on 
youtube, see for instance, URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdHJ54fZ_Bw and 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9lrYL5IpG4&feature=related).  
9 However, “bridging the gap” does not necessarily amount to a reduction of one to the 
other. 
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10 Empathy is not a necessary condition for sympathy, but both emotions have often 
been tied together in ethical and aesthetic contexts, e.g., in Lessing’s theory of sympathy 
(Mitleid) in tragedy as developed in the Hamburgische Dramaturgie. 
11 Sober and Wilson 1998, 234f. 
12 Nevertheless the concept is often traced back to romantic thinking (see Stueber, 
2006, Chap. 1). However, the romantics used the term ‘empathy’ (Einfühlung) in a quite 
specific sense to designate a sort of panpsychic symbiotic feeling of identity with nature 
(see Perpeet 1966). 
13 It was Robert Vischer who originally coined the term as a noun and technical concept 
in his work “On the Optical Sense of Form: A Contribution to Aesthetics” (1873). Yet, 
there are earlier, less technical uses, for instance, in the aesthetics of Friedrich Theodor 
Vischer (Robert Vischer’s father), and Hermann Lotze’s writings (see Stüber 2006, 
Chap. 1). 
14 See Lipps 1914, Chap. 2. 
15 An inferential view was proposed, for instance, by Ickes 1993. 
16 See, for instance, Meltzoff and Moore 1983. 
17 It is, however, an intricate matter, since the evidence is not indisputable (see 
Goldman/Sripada 2005 who discuss the topic from a simulationist point of view). 
18 See, for instance, Gallese 2001, Stüber 2006, Chap. 4. 
19 See, for instance, Rizzolatti/Craighero 2004. 
20 See Goldman 2008. 
21 See, for instance, Walton 1990, 2002; Wollheim 1998; O’Shaughnessy 2002. 
22 For different accounts, see Leslie 1987, Currie 1995, Nichols and Stich 2000. 
23 See Walton 1990. 
24 See Walton 2002. 
25 See Wollheim 1998. 
26 See Budd 1992. 
27 See Goldman 2006, 48. 
28 This might involve something like a blending mechanism as described by Fauconnier 
and Turner (see Fauconnier and Turner 1998; 2002). 
29 Eliminativism amounts to the claim that there are no mental states as we conceive of 
them in folk psychology, just brain states. This includes the non-existence of qualia. As a 
consequence, we should stop talking the way we commonly do about mental states. 
Reductionism, in contrast, claims that the mental states we assume in folk psychology do 
exist, but are reducible to neuronal events. With respect to qualia reductionists typically 
believe that the qualitative aspect of perceptual states is reducible to their 
representational content, and representational content can be explained naturalistically. 
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Therefore, the aim of reductionism is not to substitute common-sense discourse about 
mental states, but to explain it. 
30 See Horgan and Tienson 2002. 
31 See, for instance, Fodor 1998. 
32 See, for instance, Damasio 1989, Martin/Chao 2001, Caramazza/Martin 2003, 
Caramazza/Rumiati 2005, Pecher/Zwaan 2005; and, from a more philosophical point of 
view, Prinz 2005. 
33 See, for instance, Gallese/Lakoff 2005, who even want to expand this view to all kinds 
of concepts. 
34 For a defense of the phenomenal aspects of concepts following Husserl see Soldati 
2005. 
35 See Stark et al. 2001. 
36 It seems to be promising to pursue in this context the approach to study eye-
movement in human-android interaction (see MacDorman et al. 2005, Minato et al. 
2005). 
37 This position is held by Ramey 2005 
38 See Freud 1919. 
39 See Jentsch 1906. 
40 There are some interesting parallels between the perception of animacy and causality 
(Scholl and Tremoulet 2000).The particular problems autistic children have with the 
perception of animacy are also very instructive in this context (Rutherford et al. 2006). 
41 This gets us to the true core of the widespread  intuition that the uncanny valley has 
something to do with the fear of death (this was empirically studied within the 
framework of terror management research by MacDorman 2005b). 
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